The Art of the Bigger Deal
Adam Shatz
‘So, I'm looking at two-state and one-state, and I like the one that both parties like … I can live with either one,’ Donald Trump said at his press conference with Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israeli prime minister appeared to exult in Trump’s presence, until the president suggested he hold off on building more settlements while Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states worked out a deal – a ‘bigger deal’, rather. The oldest conflict in the modern Middle East – it’s a century since the Balfour declaration – has become a quarrel over real estate.
In spite of Trump's remarks on settlements – the colour drained from Netanyahu's face – there was no mystery as to which side he would take as he championed a bigger deal. (In this he was no different from any of his predecessors, merely more explicit.) Trump has always favoured landlords over tenants: the man who kept blacks out of New York City apartments is a natural ally of a man who hopes to keep Arabs out of Palestine. With Jared Kushner as his Middle East consigliere, and David Friedman the US ambassador to Israel, Trump has made no secret of his support for the Israeli right.
Trump's bigger deal is being talked up as a novel ‘outside-in’ approach. What this means, in practice, is a new form of American-backed encirclement, in which US-friendly Sunni Arab states would be recruited to impose on the Palestinians something the Jewish state, in spite of its firepower, has been unable to achieve: fictional independence, with a flag and security forces in Palestinian uniforms whose job is to protect Israel from other Palestinians who aren't wearing the uniform.
There's a view that the Arab states won't agree to this, out of respect for their Palestinian ‘brothers’. But the fear of Shia Iran outweighs residual solidarity with Palestinians under occupation. Neighbouring Arab states are already interested in peace with Israel, bypassing the Palestinians' aspirations, and in cutting economic deals with the Israelis, using shell companies that provide them with cover. As an Israeli businessman remarked in an illuminating Bloomberg article on Israeli software firms in Saudi Arabia, the Arab boycott of Israel ‘doesn’t exist’. The Israelis aren't the only ones who would benefit from Trump's bigger deal.
Liberal supporters of a two-state solution have deplored Trump's press conference as another example of his uncouthness, his disregard for a consensus based on decades of international diplomacy and, not least, his rejection of agreed ‘parameters’ for a resolution. Their mourning over the death of the ‘peace process’ ignores the fact that it has been dead for some time. A moribund process for more than twenty years, it has mainly benefited American ‘peace processors’, Israeli settlers and a narrow section of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and nomenklatura. The US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Hayley, has glossed Trump’s comments: ‘We absolutely support the two-state solution, but we are thinking out of the box as well.’
Most Palestinians in the Occupied Territories believe that their situation has deteriorated since Oslo; some fondly remember the period before the first intifada, when they could work and travel inside Israel, or what they call the ‘48 territories’: i.e. the territory they lived in before the creation of Israel. To be able to live, work and move freely in their land has always been a stronger desire among Palestinians than statehood, especially if a minuscule, sovereign Palestine means being walled off from 78 per cent of the territory to which they still feel intimately connected.
As Yezid Sayigh argued in Armed Struggle and the Search for State (1997), the Palestinian national movement was initially driven by a vision of return and restoration, rather than the replacement of Israel's occupation with a Palestinian state. The notion of statehood emerged gradually, out of a series of strategic defeats. With it came the bureaucratisation of the PLO and its transformation (or calcification) into a state apparatus without a state.
If Israel were officially to abandon its commitment to the ‘peace process’ in favour of the bigger deal – continued control, even annexation, of the West Bank, as Israeli voices to the right of Netanyahu propose – Palestinians may well decide to struggle for their own ‘bigger deal’. That is what frightens defenders of the fading two-state consensus. Here, for example, is the New York Times editorial board:
The likeliest outcome, given the growth rate of the Arab population, is that Israel would be confronted with a miserable choice: to give up being a Jewish state – or to give up being a democratic state by denying full voting rights to Palestinians.
Notice here that the ‘choice’ belongs exclusively to Israel. Palestinians, as always, are the objects of a decision, and never the decision-makers. That these options – ceasing to be a Jewish state or denying non-Jews full citizenship rights – are considered equally lamentable is a gift to historians. One day this kind of commentary will be read in much the same way as we now read Times editorials from the 1950s on the ‘Negro Problem’.
Israel made its choice long ago, without much hand-wringing. It is impossible to imagine the Jewish state without bulldozers and settlements, even in the unlikely event of the US government withdrawing its annual $3.8 billion dollars of aid. The real question isn't the choice that faces Israel, but the choice that faces Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem and the diaspora, as they confront an apartheid regime, and an impending single-state reality, which appears, this week, to have the backing of the White House, and the complicity of America's Arab allies.
Never in their history have the Palestinians been so alone, without even ritual expressions of solidarity in Arab capitals. Never have they been in such desperate need of new leadership. Israel is betting on the exhaustion, disarray and fragmentation of the Palestinian political class. A breakthrough will probably involve a return to first principles, above all self-determination, which has been slowly eroded since Oslo, when the Palestinian national struggle gave way to ‘security co-operation’ that was supposed to precede independence, the NGO-isation of the West Bank, and futile, interminable discussions about land swaps, and ‘parameters’ for a solution. That was the failed deal. Trump's bigger deal looks worse, and far more provocative.
Comments
Since that time the Palestinians have twice had the opportunity to end the conflict and establish a state of their own, in 2000 and in 2008, in negotiations with Barak and Olmert, who made reasonable offers based on an exchange of land. The parameters of a two-state solution are clear to everyone. All the Palestinians have to do is return to the negotiating table, as Netanyahu has invited them to do more than once. Contrary to what your writer asserts, the choice really is theirs, and theirs alone. It is true that Abu Mazen is not strong enough to make peace and Hamas doesn’t want to make peace, but there is no real alternative, because Israel is not going to annex the West Bank, though if the Palestinians refuse to negotiate an end to the conflict it may unilaterally annex the settlement blocs, involving around five percent of West Bank territory. I say this categorically though it is only my opinion, but at least it is based on an intimate understanding of the country and its people.
By the way, Liberman once proposed offering the PA Wadi Ara in exchange, which woukd be a real bonus for them, but lo and behild! the vast majority of Israeli Arabs, according to polls, would refuse to live under Palestinian sovereignty. Imagine that! They prefer apartheid Israel to democratic Palestine. Maybe you can explain that too.
What is more concerning is that he seems to be coming from a place where any of this justifies the oppression of a people and the denial of their rights. He asks the Palestinians to choose between more of the same or slightly less. That is not how human rights and international law are supposed to operate.
All occupations are oppressive and all occupations curtail certain rights. In the West Bank this is directly related to acts of terror. There may be a cycle but there is also an initiator of the cycle.
Having an independent state is not more of the same or slightly less. They are not going to get one if they do not negotiate an end to the conflict.
2. Your justification for the occupation is, "You start a war, you lose a war, you get your territory occupied." But Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan, and Israel and Jordan have had a peace treaty since 1994.
3. "Israel is not going to annex the West Bank." The reason for this is that Israel does not want to give the Palestinians citizenship, and if it formally annexed the territory and denied citizenship to its non-Jewish inhabitants, it would be impossible to deny that the situation constitutes apartheid. So the pretense of temporary occupation continues, while the continuing settlement expansion makes it permanent in practice.
Israeli Arabs do not live under apartheid. They are citizens of Israel. Israel within the '48 borders is not an apartheid state.
West Bank Palestinians live under apartheid. They are not citizens of Israel. The Israel-occupied West Bank is an apartheid state, because its Jewish inhabitants have Israeli citizenship, while its Palestinian inhabitants are denied it, and there are separate towns, roads and facilities for each of the two communities, with the superior ones reserved for the Israelis.
The distinction isn't complicated to grasp. I suspect you are confusing it on purpose.
Israel attacked Egypt because Egypt had closed the Straits of Tiran, which was a casus belli and violated the 1956 agreements, not to mention the movement of six divisions (100,000 men) and 1,000 tanks toward Israel's border and Nasser's declaration on May 26 that the time had come to destroy Israel. If your neighbor had been threatening to murder your family and burn your house down for 20 years and then marched up to your front door with a gang of armed men, you would have to be crazy not to shoot first. Be a hero with your own children, not mine.
Hussein joined the war because Nasser told him that Egypt had destroyed 75% of Israel's air force and invited him to join the festivities.
Jordan relinquished all claims to the West Bank in 1988.
Once again, all the Palestinians have to do is return to the negotiating table. That is the only way the occupation is going to end.
No, West Bank Palestinians do not live under apartheid. They live under a military occupation with all that entails and of course Israeli civilians have Israeli citizenship and Palestinians do not, just as American civilians had American citizenship during the occupation of Germany and Germans did not. From that point of view, it makes absolutely no difference if the Israeli civilians live in settlements or military bases. The question of the legality of the settlements is an entirely different issue and at this point completely irrelevant since their final dispostion will be determined in the framework of a negotiated agreement.
I assume you have never been in the West Bank. Superior roads? The separate roads are security roads, which is an answer to terrorist attacks. They certainly aren't superior to anything. The Arab towns are where they've always been and under PA civil adninistration. Jews do live in Hebron but the Palestinians certainly don't want them there.
That, in polite English, means put up or shut up.
"Article 24: This Organization does not exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on the Gaza Strip or in the Himmah Area. Its activities will be on the national popular level in the liberational, organizational, political and financial fields."
Quoted disdainfully as an example of Judaeocentric thinking; but what other kind is effective given the balance of power and the absence of an effective and legitimate Palestinian leadership?
Ariel Sharon, of all people, architect of the West Bank settlement policy, had got this far in his reasoning, and was urging withdrawal to defensible boundaries in a 2-state solution, shortly before his stroke. The reckless policies of his successors have now put - what? - perhaps half a million Israeli voters on land that would have to be given up in such a deal, making it internally politically impossible.
Arafat was offered something like such a deal by Ehud Barak at Camp Dvid in 2000, and turned it down. There is now no good solution. The 1967 war itself, origin of the occupation, was a pre-emptive Israeli strike, triggered by Arab (especially Egyptian) military buildup and declarations.
I grieve for the Palestinians, even more unfortunate in their leaders and friends than in their enemies.