‘The Truth over the Dnieper’
Maxim Edwards
The official newspaper of the regional military administration in Russian-occupied Kherson was called Naddniepryanskaya Pravda, or ‘The Truth over the River Dnieper’. When Ukraine’s army liberated Kherson last November, locals tore down the ‘forever with Russia’ billboards and burned the propaganda sheets in the streets. As with other pro-Moscow propaganda newspapers published across occupied Ukraine, behind this newspaper’s crass triumphalism lie some clues to the contours of Russian military rule and the terror of daily life under it.
Not every copy was burned, but it’s hard to get hold of now. Kherson is subject to relentless bombardment; my friends there could send me scans of the paper only with difficulty. The rest of Russia’s local propaganda outreach remains online. As the Ukrainian investigative site texty.ua discovered, the Russian authorities launched an extensive network of collaborationist Telegram channels for several Ukrainian regions before their invasion almost a year ago. Last August in Kherson they launched Tavriya TV, a pro-Russian television channel headed by Kirill Stremousov, a local fringe blogger who was appointed deputy head of the occupation government in April. He died in a car crash in November, shortly before the Russian withdrawal.
As Russian state media put it, the printed paper was aimed at the elderly, the poor and the internetless. It was to be freely available in shops, pharmacies, petrol stations and public buildings. According to Ukraine’s union of journalists it was established last July, following the Russian seizure of the Hryvnia print house in Kherson. Serhiy Nikitenko, the editor of the independent website Most, drew my attention to the attempt to appeal to Soviet nostalgia: a Soviet-era publication called Naddniepryanskaya Pravda had struggled through to the 2010s. The resurrected version had the USSR’s Order of Labour medal in its masthead with the words ‘published since March 1928’.
None of the stories carried bylines, but independent Ukrainian media claim to have identified local journalists who offered their services. Although several Kherson journalists have told me that Naddniepryanskaya Pravda interested few and convinced even fewer during the occupation, it demonstrates the system of incentives in place at the time and provide context for the choices some locals had to make. An appreciation of that may be crucial in determining the attitude of the Ukrainian government to its recently liberated citizens.
The diktats of the Moscow-appointed governor, Volodymyr Saldo, were prominent on the front pages. Last June, Saldo outlawed ‘propagandising terrorism’ and ‘discrediting’ or ‘disseminating false information’ about state institutions. All of these were already illegal in Russia. But in Kherson, the punishment was to be ‘summarily deported’ from the region – potentially a crime under international law.
An article in August claimed that thousands of Ukrainians were fleeing into Russian-occupied territories, attracted by the stability, family reunion and ‘lack of Nazism’. Chiefly, though, they were coming for the jobs. The paper advertised employment in the many institutions controlled or established by the Russians. Hundreds of positions needed to be filled: cleaners, librarians, accountants, medical staff. Even former Ukrainian soldiers who had fought in the east were welcome to apply for a job at the local interior ministry, with the oblique demand that they had ‘not committed crimes’.
The lack of teachers became a major preoccupation as the new school year approached in September. It was ‘intolerable’ that teachers could sit at home while ‘continuing to be paid by the Kyiv regime’. The arrival of several hundred teachers from Russia wasn’t enough. Mayak, a collaborationist newspaper from the Beryslav district in the north of Kherson Region, mocked teachers in the village of Novovoskresenske who refused to go to work ‘because they want to introduce Russian there’. The anonymous author wondered whether physics and maths were also ‘Muscovite’, and reminded recalcitrant doctors of the Hippocratic oath.
These reprimands came alongside grand claims of Russia’s capacity to send in the Stakhanovites and rebuild the Ukraine it refuses to admit it destroyed – a mainstay of many Naddniepryanskaya Pravda front covers. While Russia was constructing on a Soviet scale – look at the Kerch Bridge, connecting occupied Crimea to Russia’s mainland – ‘a new building has become a rare thing in so-called independent Ukraine.’ As another bonus for Kherson, severance from Ukraine meant reunification with Crimea.
One headline described Kherson as a land of ‘Russian people with Ukrainian passports’. Even the Ukrainian census of 2001, the article claimed, acknowledged that 97 per cent of the Kherson Region’s population were Russian. If you look at the census, this figure can only have been derived by adding together Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. It is a telling calculation, implying that Ukrainian identity may exist only as a provincial form of Russianness, artificially inflated to a nationality by foreign powers. They were all strongly encouraged to apply for Russian citizenship: life would be possible without a Russian social security number, ‘but it will be like the 1990s’.
Naturally, there were warnings of Nazis, defined by one anonymous contributor as those who ‘forbid being proud and remembering. They excise everything Russian: monuments, culture, language.’ An article on fascist movements in Ukraine was illustrated with a photograph of a far-right march in Moscow in 2012. Russia’s invading troops were not met with flowers, the paper claimed, only because the locals were too afraid after years of bans on overt pro-Russian activism. This is not so much about winning Ukrainians’ hearts and minds as restoring them to supposed factory settings.
As Ukraine’s counteroffensive crept closer to Kherson, the confident propaganda morphed uneasily into crisis messaging. It didn’t matter, the paper claimed, that the ‘monkeys with HIMARS’ had shelled the Antonovskyi Bridge, which connected the city to the Russian-occupied territory east of the Dnieper. ‘Normal life is gathering pace in the region,’ Naddniepryanskaya Pravda reported. ‘The only people who won’t see it are delusional, living in parallel realities created by Ukrainian propaganda.’
The Russian forces withdrew from Kherson on 11 November, taking their ‘truth’ with them across the Dnieper. Occasional copies can be still found for sale on Ukrainian auction websites, alongside other trophies that Kyiv’s soldiers have taken from the frontlines. Publishing continues on the other side of the river; a December issue of Naddniepryanskaya Pravda announced that Russian troops will return to the city of Kherson, which they describe as ‘temporarily occupied by Ukraine’.
With thanks to Marc Bennetts, Olena Makarenko and Evgeniya Virlich
Comments
The basic narrative is contained in Putin's essay 'On the unity of Russians and Ukrainians'. Everybody interested in the topic should read it. Like Mein Kampf, it is the key to what happened after it was written. The main point is contained in the title: Ukraine should be part of Russia, because the peoples of these two countries are historically one people, and the territory of Ukraine is historically part of Russia. (He applies the same argument to Belarus, but in that case Belarus is already within the Russian sphere of influence - in effect, a province of Russia - so that bit has been overlooked).
The problem with this thesis is that if all Ukrainians are Russians, then the claim that Ukrainians are oppressing a Russian minority is logically untenable. Putin might have claimed that one lot of Russians is oppressing another lot of Russians: it might or might not have been truthful, but at least it would not have been absurd. However, that would hardly have justified the invasion. After all, one lot of Russians is oppressing another lot of Russians, within Russia itself.
It seems to me that there are two forces driving Putin's invasion of Ukraine. One is his vision of a 'Russky Mir', essentially a revival of the old pan-Slavism of the nineteenth century (one of the journals promoting this was actually called 'Russky Mir'). The other is his aversion to the existence of a (more or less) democratic state on his borders; this is a threat because it shows that there is an alternative to Putin's autocratic oligarchy.
In practice, Ukraine is far from democratic and has a longstanding corruption problem. It is only democratic and transparent in relative terms. But if Russia is successful in occupying Ukraine and bringing it within the Russky Mir, it will not stop there. We may write off Ukraine, but as Orwell pointed out, it is not a good idea even pragmatically to watch your friends being destroyed by your enemies one by one, and to do nothing to prevent it. Because eventually, you will be next.
Ukraine is the most corrupt state in Europe.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine
The LRB pointing out russian propaganda is fine. What about Ukrainian? Wouldnt that be worth it?
And I Wonder if the LRB has any thoughts on who blew up nordstream? Seems the country that did that is the true threat. Hersh has a piece on it and given that he was a regular here, I can only imagine they passed on his piece. Perhaps they should say why?
P.S. Proud to be middle class.
The British always treat war as a last resort (except when it comes to carving out an empire) but when there is no alternative, we are prepared for it. If the parallels are being drawn with the 1930s, that is because the parallels are quite striking.
Do they want to read justifications for an illegal invasion; a war of aggression; for setting up torture centres in every occupied town and village; theft on an industrial scale; torture, rape, and murder of civilians; the illegal deportation of woman and children; the brainwashing of children and their farming out to patriotic families deep inside Russia (what will become of them?); the destruction of apartment blocks and civilian infrastructure by long-range missiles; the use of nuclear power stations as military fortresses; the annexation of a neighbouring country's land; the looting and destruction of museums and libraries; the suppression of a national culture and language and the murder of tens of thousands of civilians and of soldiers who are defending their homes and families.
What do these people want to hear?
2. What is a reasonable basis for a cease-fire?
Does that make me a Putin stooge?
And I refuse to read further into any article about Ukraine unless the words cease-fire, now and negotiate appear in the first sentence of said article, this war has to stop.
Give that piece of work the Sudetenland and he won't be satisfied until his troops are goose stepping their way through Prague. The political logic is grim, but obvious. If you are seen as a winner, people will follow you to the ends of the earth. If you are seen as a loser your power will melt away. Putin has to lose this war so badly that he is utterly humiliated. He will soon go then. Any negotiation that leaves him with any territorial gains and Ukraine not a member of NATO will simply serve to let him regroup, replan and then have a second bite of the cherry.