Aristotle’s Four Causes
Eli Zaretsky
According to Aristotle, we cannot understand something unless we understand what causes it, but ‘cause’ for Aristotle was a complex, multi-layered concept. In the case of the present war between Ukraine and Russia, Aristotle would have described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the efficient cause – the immediate precipitant – but would have argued that a fuller understanding must include the material history of Europe; the form given to that history by the Second World War and its long aftermath, which left the US in effective control of the continent; and the overall or final direction of history at stake in the conflict.
I want to focus here on the form given to the conflict by America’s preponderant role in European politics. I will concentrate on five interrelated questions: America’s overall relation to Europe; European self-governance; the German question; the Russian question; and Eurasia.
The starting point for any understanding of America’s role in Europe must be the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Provoked by the Latin American revolts against Spain, the doctrine was an attempt to forestall European intervention in the Western hemisphere. But this was balanced with the promise, in President Monroe’s words, ‘not to interfere in the internal concerns of any [European] powers’ – in other words, ‘to consider [any existing European] government de facto as the legitimate government for us.’
The doctrine was modified in the 20th century, beginning with Woodrow Wilson’s rejection of balance-of-power politics and his call for ‘internationalism’, but this shift was always one-sided. The US retained its ‘right’, based on the Monroe Doctrine, to exclude ‘foreign’ interference in the Western hemisphere, but assumed a new right to interfere elsewhere in the world. That opened the way to the current situation: America is not only preponderant in Europe today; this preponderance reflects an enormous global imbalance.
Second, America’s disproportionate power reflects the long-standing difficulties Europe has had in organising its own relations. In effect, European governments have been infantilised since the Second World War. The most obvious example of this is the fact that Nato’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe has to be an American general. European governments distrust one another, but rather than work out their differences, they rely on the United States. Financially, too, European security is underwritten by American wealth at the cost of European autonomy. The 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that ‘Nato welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership’ was opposed by France and Germany, but to no avail. This has enormous consequences for the present crisis.
Third, American power in Europe has substituted for a long-term solution to ‘the German question’. By virtue of its size, geographic position and economic power, Germany ought to play a leading role in mediating between East and West, in other words, between Russia and Western Europe, but, in good part because of the catastrophe of Nazism, has been reluctant to do so. This has left a vacuum, which the US has filled in a negative way – by perpetuating the split between Western and Eastern Europe, which began as a form of colonialism after the Second World War. To be sure, America has been pivotal in encouraging Eastern European economic development, but at the cost of empowering the region’s most Russophobic elements, which historically have been on the right. Poland’s role in servicing the CIA’s torture ‘black sites’ is an example of what I mean.
Fourth, the possibilities for peace that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev offered to both Europe and the United States in 1989-90 were of a sort that comes along very rarely, not even once a century. Gorbachev spoke of ‘our common European home’. Under American leadership, however, the West’s response was to expand Nato, an anti-Russian alliance both in its origins and at present, and to impose shock therapy on the Russian economy. Russia, historically, has always contained both democratic and statist elements. America’s outsize role encouraged the statist side of its politics, which was by no means inevitably dominant. No one can really say how post-1989 Russia would have developed if it had not been treated with condescension and hostility, but those are the conditions that produced Putin.
Fifth, American ‘internationalism’, as shown by its disproportionate role in Europe, has global implications, especially for East Asia. In the late 19th and early 20th century, when American foreign policy began to shift from the balance of power implicit in the Monroe Doctrine to its grandiose and vague ‘internationalism’, thinkers such as Halford Mackinder – arguably Theodore Roosevelt’s favourite geographer – began to see the value of keeping the European peninsula divided from Russia. For Mackinder, such a division was preferable to forms of peace and co-operation that would make Eurasia, the world’s ‘heartland’, the centre of geopolitics, reducing American sea power to a secondary role. Whether consciously or not, American thinkers were guided by this insight not only in 1989 but in 1917 and 1945. In other words, they have sought to keep Europe and Russia divided. This has implications for America’s present relations not only to Russia but also to China.
To conclude: there is no question that America has contributed to world peace, especially through its part in the defeat of German and Italian fascism and Japanese militarism, and in filling the vacuum left in Europe after the Second World War. But this history has left global politics with a fundamental problem at the centre: America’s disproportionate role. This problem is not merely contingent, it is structural. The United States, which has no security problems of its own, regularly launches foreign wars, as in Vietnam or Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as fostering proxy militarisations, as in Eastern Europe and Ukraine, without paying any price, and without learning anything from its mistakes. The result is hubris. This has immediate implications for the Ukraine conflict, in that America’s leadership has an interest in keeping the war going. As Aristotle argued, we cannot understand any event merely in its immediate context, but need to understand long-term causes both in the sense of what brought the event about, and in the sense of the ‘final cause’ that the event serves.
Comments
Do Ukrainians have the right to seek to determine their own future? Or must they be a 'neutral' buffer to placate their paranoid, imperial neighbour? Or must they accept the thesis that they are no less Russian than Shropshire is English?
Russian imperialism long predates Munroe and Wilson. And while there are certainly mistakes one might point to in American foreign policy, it would have been reckless to disregard centuries of experience on the hope that Russia might pivot so dramatically.
Nobody bears responsibility for Russian aggression but Russia. Its actions validate the continued existence of NATO as a fundamentally anti-Russian alliance. And indeed, those actions make clear that neighbours who wish to preserve their sovereignty must join NATO - the alternative is to strain against an ever-shorter leash. Belarus is the future-state.
When, in all its history, has Russian rejected imperialism, militarism, and dictatorship? Never, but for the very briefest period in the early 1990s. And this is the period America should have bet upon?
Bet that the wife-beater, having bought a bunch of flowers, is changed?
The greatest lesson of the last 30 years is never to appease Russia, and certainly never give up your nukes.
Key to saberinde's misunderstanding is "The greatest lesson of the last 30 years is never to appease Russia, and certainly never give up your nukes."
42 years ago Solidarnosc was founded. 10 years later Walensa was president and Poland a russian-influence-free zone. And all that was achieved without a single javelin missile fired. During the subsequent 30 years all other Middle/Eastern European capitals managed to remove Russian tanks each in their own way by peaceful means.
Russian imperialism during the last 40 years, like all imperialisms, relied on internal support (Naijbulla, ..., Azad, ..., Lukashenko).
And the the tired old "appeasement" trope. Chamberlain got into No 10 in Mai 1937 and two years later Britain was at war. Hardly the same as the 40 year period to dismantle the Russian gains of WWII.
The issue is not if the 2014 was morally just but if it was politically effective.
https://news.sky.com/story/ex-ukraine-leader-do-not-rule-out-military-action-against-russia-11306185
Putin's habit of poisoning people he doesn't care for goes back a long way.
It is a pity that Aristotle did not say anything about such an efficient cause as the role of Russian (Soviet) imperialism in post-war Europe and the post-Soviet resentment that gave rise to Putin's authoritarianism, who started the war in Ukraine
I just blame Putin for the invasion and the deaths of thousands and the displacement of millions. No need for a conjunction.
As to the US people in WW 1, I agree, they didnt want to go to war. Wilson pulled them in kicking and screaming. The Germans were at that time the US's largest minority. The Irish certainly didnt want to help England. Not sure though how this relates.
More common currently is the attempted syllogism:
Hitler was/did xyz
Putin = Hitler
Therefore ... debate over - unless you want to support Hitler.
The problem with Aristotle is that he is a bit of an essentialist. But the author wisely refrained to explain any final causes of the Ukraine war.
On the Belgium issue: the atrocities committed by the German army in Belgium could well have parallels in the Ukraine. In Belgium German officers were given very precise targets for their daily advance. But because most troops were raw conscripts and Belgium resistance was more determined than imagined by the Schliefen planners these could not be achieved. Officers found themselves behind plan, lost their professionalism and started committing murders.
What is on topic is the behavioural phenonmenon of seeking dominance over others and the urge to drive up the pecking order. This is the rule rather than the exception in the primate world. LRB doesn't have enough terabytes to record all the instances where nations have behaved appallingly in order to assert dominance over others and even before nations were doing it, tribes were doing it. This one really is in our DNA, never mind the post hoc rationalisations.
What other nations may have done is an utter irrelavance when looking at the war in Ukraine. What is relevant is the answer to the question "Is Putin out to dominate us?".
The poisoning of Litvinenko was an epiphany for me as to the nature of the man we are dealing with and his intentions. It should have been a wake up call to the world's democracies too. If forced to choose between America's evil empire and Russia's, I'll take America's any day.
Putin hates democracies. As soon as Georgia managed to get a democratic government they were on his hit list for invasion.
Thank god for NATO and thank god that we haven't thrown away our nukes.
The Finns have forgotten more about having to deal with Russian dictators than every one posting here knows. Their reaction to this invasion should inform anyone as to what is at stake.
You put up the strawman of an anti-American Mexico to assert the threat of an anti-Russian Ukraine. The reality is Ukraine has no territorial designs on Russia, and neither do Europe or America. Their postures are defensive. Nobody serious believes that anyone wants to invade Russia. If Russia is concerned with its territorial integrity then its disputes are with China and Japan.
If Russian paranoia is explained by Napoleon and Hitler, it's difficult to see the modern analogue. Both had to conquer a series of states before reaching Russia. So who is the modern Napoleon fighting his way along the road to Moscow? Hint: he doesn't exist. The EU doesn't even have its own army!
You are merely another in a long line of imperialist apologists clothed in realpolitik. You imagine great powers, spheres of influence, and nations within them who exist merely to make their powerful neighbours feel secure.
In doing so, you posit equivalence between liberal democracies which have no territorial designs on their neighbours, and imperialist, militaristic dictatorships. The true threat to Russia isn't a Ukraine that wants to invade it, but a neighbour that demonstrates what a better-run economy and a freer society looks like.
On the question of NATO missiles in Russia's backyard, you seem to ask more of the West than Russia. The bully has just punch someone and you ask the victim to consider the bullets feelings before they punch back! Ukraine wanted NATO and EU membership in reaction to Russian aggression. The poisoning of Yushchenko. The disruption of their energy supplies. The cyber attacks. The invasion in 2014. Ukraine looked at Belarus and rejected that future. A defensive consequence of Russian policy, not an aggressive posture towards Russia. And now we see Finland and Sweden seeking to join NATO for the same reasons.
Russia seeks to rebuild its empire, and you believe this is the West's fault. You're victim-blaming!
Given their vast supplies of grain and hydrocarbons a peaceful and democratically run Russia would never be isolated from Europe, quite the opposite. This war is about preserving and extending Putin's dictatorship. It's that simple.
Labarov a big fan of yours?
My impression is that the current Russian regime leaves targeted assassinations and torture usually to local allies (Belorussia, Syria, Chechnia, Kasachstan, ...).
the feuilleton answer is: yes, there are three hidden Gorbachevs who would.
the math answer is: the sentence "if Yeltsin lived now he would have done exactly the same" has a truth value of 1.
the historical answer is: in the West since about 400 BC we distinguish at least four causes (see the heading of ths article) and mixing them up or playing one against the other is just petulent.
or: it may well be that Caesar's deeds had some deep psychological reason but it also took many causes to enable him to enact his genocidal policies. Including - if I am allowed to say so - several mistakes on the part of the Gauls and their leaders who ended up as the victims.
Whatever the excesses of American imperialism, it is Russia, not America, that has invaded and destroyed huge parts of Ukraine, killing tens of thousands of Ukrainians, deporting to Russia vast numbers. It is asinine to call American defence of Western Europe from Stalin's totalitarianism colonialist. Zaretski owes his misused freedom to it.
The reason Putin invaded Ukraine was not that it joined NATO but that it could not. The only states in Europe bordering Russia that feel safe from |Russian aggression are NATO members. As for giving away bits of Ukraine to placate Putin, he will simply take them and come back for more.
Putin is an extreme fascist ideologue, influenced by neo-Nazi thinkers like Alexander Dugin and Ivan Ilyin. He is totally hostile to all forms of Western liberalism, and will do all he can to destroy it. Giving in to him is not a option.
Your piece is atrocious.
Suppose there is a rape. The rapist might resort to Aristotle : "The immediate precipitant or "efficient cause" was the woman standing there with a short skirt and fine legs. The "material history" is the general drive to procreate. "The form of the history" is the tendency of women to wear short skirts. And the "final" significance? Great fun for all and just let them supply more women!'"
As for the causal analysis, it is worth being reminded of Aristotle's method. At the same time, as has been pointed out above, knowing how we got to a place is not the whole story. We need to know where we are going from here. The question now is not 'whence' but 'whither'. As Lenin put it, "what is to be done, comrades?" And in answering this I am with Graucho and some others.
I am pretty sure Vladimir Putin believes what he has been saying about Ukraine. But that does not reassure me, but only reminds me of the quote about Robespierre. Personally, I do not want to live in a world where the ideals of a man like President Putin predominate (or, heaven help us, in a world where a future President Trump is in the saddle in the US).
In the current debate the "we are where we are" trope is mostly used to shut down any attempt to learn from mistakes.
The argument goes
1. Putin is absolutely evil
2. Therefore there everybody who raises the possibility that the Ukrainian government or the West made any mistakes is a Putin apologist and morally corrupt.
But the therefore does not follow. That evil exist is a well known fact and can not be used as an excuse for policy failures.
Or in terms of Ethics: a good action also must consider the (unintended) consequences.
However hypocritical this stance may be, Ukraine is seen as a test case for whether Western democracy, however imperfect, can resist a totalitarian state with all the advantages such a state has in terms of being able to devote its economy to war without fearing popular dissent.
One thing we are apt to lose sight of in the horrible fascination of watching a war being fought in Europe, is that Nemesis is coming to all of us, in the shape of climate change. And there is, bizarrely, a direct link to the Ukraine war. Last year's wildfires in Siberia broke records. And this year, the fires are burning out of control because the military units that normally fight them, are engaged in Ukraine. At some point we will need to stop fighting one another and join against the common enemy, climate change. And I have no faith that President Putin is serious about the threat from global warming, given that the Russian economy is so dependent on fossil fuel use.
As for Taiwan, I know the place and the people. Unlike their murderous counterparts in the Chinese communist party they run a decent democratic country. Thank goodness the U.S. has signalled that it won't sit on its hands if Putin's fellow despot Xi decides to invade and subject them to the Tiananmen square treatment. The more I think about your squatter's rights logic the stupider it gets. Let's start with all those countries that were part of the Roman empire for 500 odd years. Should Italy start reclaiming those ?
BTW can we dispense with that canard about the U.S. sponsored coup in Ukraine. It was a highly popular uprising against a corrupt Russian puppet who was enriching himself at the people's expense. President Yanukovych was actually elected in part thanks to an American Manafort a disgraced Trump aid.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity
"US policy is not preeving Ukrainian independence, its shoving missiles up into the Russian's noses, its humiliating not just Putin, but the entire Russian elite,". Good. It's about time someone did something about a cabal of murderous thugs who think that they can assasinate U.K. residents and political opponents with impunity.
"its about keeping Russia separate from Europe" No, it's about keeping Putin out of Europe and I wish you would stop using the word Russia when you should be using the word Putin. This is his war, not Russia's as the large number of incredibly courageous Russians who have opposed it demonstrates.
https://news.sky.com/story/russian-diplomat-boris-bondarev-resigns-over-ukraine-war-saying-he-has-never-been-so-ashamed-of-my-country-12619768
Plus: I think it is ok to discuss the causes of war. Eli very wisely refrained from mentioning the final cause in his article or making any recommendations. That could be the subject of his next contribution?
And so it goes (ITT).
Once again any attempt, here in the West, to add context to this situation is met with "Pro-Kremlin" talking points. Even if one adds the usual "I'm against this criminal invasion". Meeting this kind of resistance everywhere. Same with the need to paint Putin as some kind of monster. Sure, he is, but when compared to the likes of American POTUSs? Note the 377k dead in Yemen and mass starvation of Afghanistan, to name a the most recent examples. Horrendous, but having all the great powers not negotiate with the US because of this would lead to worse. And that gets us to the reason for the "Putin monster" talk, which is not only do we get an enemy of the most vile kind (as usual) but one we cannot talk to.
Foolish stuff, and it might be that some in the highest echelons are high on their own surprise. I always assumed there would be back channel talks through all this, but Ray McGovern has pointed out that there are no signs that this is going on. [1] Which, given Russia's limited ICBM detection capabilities, is criminal.
But one, and I certainly do, must sense some de ja vu of the manufacturing consent kind [2]. I'm not actually thinking of the Iraq War, though that same chorus from the MSM is familiar. No, I mean the Afghanistan war. The start, where only a handful of peaceniks tried to point out that it wouldn't end well. That there could be another way to peace, one only needed to take in the context of the entire situation, but no one listened. Certainly no one that mattered. Any talk of context got you shouted down and as an enemy no less.
So it goes.
And I won't get into the rifts forming from all this that will make facing the real problems we have (climate change) much worse. For one, the fossil fuel types in the US are ecstatic at now being lauded as saviors of the West.
So here we go again, slow marching ourselves over the cliff.
[1] Note Ray started when he opposed the Iraq War, properly calling out the intel for that war as simply wrong, nevermind the morality of the war.
[2] And chomsky shows this by pointing out "unprovoked Ukrainian war" will get you way more hits on google than "unprovoked Iraq War".
His principal stated aim in the present conflict was to prevent the strengthening of NATO. He has achieved the opposite. Finland and Sweden will be joining it (or if Turkey continues to object, they will make some sort of arrangement with NATO that would amount to the same thing), and a body that had been trending towards a distinctly doubtful future has been revitalised. The Russian economy is now headed towards stagnation in the medium term and destitution later on. Russia is both detested (for its brutality) and despised (for the patent incompetence of its armed forces) in much of the world. There are few more abject sights than a bully that is not strong enough to intimidate any more.
That said, I wonder if the Russians might not have an outside chance of winning after all. A war economy plus mobilisation of Russia's two million reservists might eventually wear down the Ukrainians, if only because the Russians can afford to lose more men, even at a ratio of three to one. If the mid-term elections go the Republicans' way, they might be able to control Congress and prevent further subventions to Ukraine. And in 2024 we might have a second Trump administration, and we know how much Donald Trump admires President Putin.
The Russians seem at present to have lost. And personally, from a selfish point of view, I would prefer to live in a world in which they do lose, without making any comparative moral judgements either way (and I take the points about American hypocrisy, Gaza, Yemen, Afghanistan etc etc). But we would be foolish to write the Russians off at this stage. History shows that they are very good at enduring enormous hardships and continuing to battle through.
The modern "West" thinks in terms of borders: Here blue vs. there red. The Roman "limes" was more of a "glacis:" A glacis in military engineering is an artificial slope as part of a medieval castle or in early modern fortresses. They may be constructed of earth as a temporary structure or of stone in more permanent structure. Please note, there is no English word for it.
In the olden days, most countries were surrounded by "glacis" - and Ukraine was a "glacis" between the Rus in the forests and the Golden Horde. Cossacks lived in these spaces, changing coats... These were spaces beyond the military capacity of the empires, but where trade flourished. James C. Scott (The art of not being governed) has shown the resilience of such interstitial spaces.
In biology, cells are often separated by "interstitial spaces." They have a clear function. They imply "semi-permeable" walls.
Unfortunately, Putin's vision is not for a glacis but the DDR wall of his youth, where the Voice of America the only social network. This is nostalgia.
Both sides better grapple with the inanity of borders.
as abcd85 says ever since the various "Mongol" state(lets) crashed and/or went native a very mixed melange of aristocatic holdings developed. For these people class was important. "Ethnicity" was for peasants.
During the 19th century nationalist movements developed. With the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian empires the arstocratic class lost its coercive/military support.
By the time of the Versaille treaty the US had lost its interest in Middle/Eastern Europe and a coterie of nationalist movements lobbied in Paris and Washington for each county and district to be attached to their ideal nation state. Best example is the Pittsburgh Agreement: one group of Czech nationalist agrees with one of the Slovak groups to form a state. Plus they managed to have "German", "Polish", "Hungarian" districts attached to their state. All in quotation marks because these places were themselves very mixed. All these borders were inane as abcd85 says.
The following three decades between 1919 and 1945 resulted in ethnic cleansing and (forced) migration on a vast scale. A stasis was only achieved under Soviet hegemony. Each state had a clear unassailable line drawn around it. Within nation, language, religon, ethnicity were by and large one and the same. Except for the Ukraine.
US hegemony only starts again with the partioning of the former Jugoslasvia along enthnic lines.
Britain never had a role in that area. Only in the fantasie of Churchill tribute acts. The Munich Treaty and the subsequent Phoney War shows that. Key text here is Churchill's account in the Road to War.
The current war has already produced millions of displaced and I doubt they all will be allowed to back.