Trump Declares War
Adam Shatz
Qasem Soleimani – a major-general in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and the leader of its Quds Force, a unit responsible for external and clandestine operations – was once described by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic’s supreme leader, as ‘a living martyr of the revolution’. The living martyr is now a dead martyr, killed in an American airstrike along with five other people at Baghdad airport. Khamenei, who promoted Soleimani posthumously to lieutenant-general, has tweeted that ‘harsh vengeance’ is forthcoming; Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Lebanese Hizbullah, has declared that it is the ‘responsibility and task of all resistance fighters worldwide’ to avenge their deaths.
There is no doubt that Iran and its proxies have the capacity to respond. In large part thanks to Soleimani’s work over the past two decades, the Islamic Republic has carved out a zone of regional influence that is both wide and deep. Its networks are especially powerful in Iraq, where Americans have been ordered by their government to leave as soon as possible. It was recent clashes between the US and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq – the US killed two dozen members of Iraqi Hizbullah after an American contractor was killed near Kirkuk, and the US Embassy was stormed by militia sympathisers – that led to Soleimani’s assassination.
Soleimani, born in rural eastern Iran in 1957, was a member of the revolutionary generation and a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, in which nearly a million Iranians died. His belief that Iran had to be strong – and Iraq weak and divided – was shaped by his wartime experiences; so was his hostility to the United States, which backed Saddam’s forces while they used poison gas against Iranian troops. His first task in the war was to supply water to soldiers: ‘I entered the war on a fifteen-day mission, and ended up staying until the end.’ He came to see the battlefield as ‘mankind’s lost paradise – the paradise in which morality and human conduct are at their highest’, and demonstrated both ingenuity and ruthlessness in expanding Iranian influence throughout the Middle East and Afghanistan.
He acquired an abundance of enemies, many of whom are surely celebrating his violent end: Americans who fought in Iraq, where forces trained by Soleimani killed hundreds of US soldiers; the Israelis, who recognised him as a formidable asset to the Islamic Republic and Hizbullah; Syrian opponents of the Assad regime, which was saved by Soleimani’s intervention; the Saudis, who saw him as the fearsome architect of a ‘Shia crescent’ imperiling their interests in Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon; the militants of the Islamic State, who despise the Shia as heretics. There are many in Iran, too, who won’t miss him. A tireless defender of the Islamic Republic and unswerving ally of Khamenei, he made no secret of his conviction that state repression was an appropriate and necessary response to street protests; in 1999 he signed a letter from a group of Revolutionary Guard leaders to President Mohammed Khatami, telling him that if he did not crush a student revolt by force, they would.
Yet Soleimani could also be a pragmatist. He worked with the Americans in Afghanistan and was nearly as skilful at brokering ceasefires in Iraq as he was in organising military operations and collecting intelligence. His major objective was to increase Iranian influence and to bolster Shia power in the region; his success won no little respect among Iranians, even among those who dislike the Islamic Republic for its authoritarianism. He was also admired by many Shia in southern Lebanon, in spite of some (very quietly voiced) criticism over the scale of Lebanese Shia casualties in Syria.
He was a senior political leader as well as a general, which made him an untouchable figure for the Americans: until Trump came to power, killing him was understood to be off the table. Late in 2017, a Kuwaiti paper reported that the Israelis had received a green light to assassinate Soleimani, but hardly anyone took the rumour seriously. For all his recklessness in dismantling the nuclear agreement with Iran (one of Obama’s signature policies), and despite his rhetoric, Trump seemed averse to actual military escalation. Last September he fired John Bolton, a longstanding proponent of war with Iran, from his position as national security adviser. A few days later the United States did not respond to a drone attack against Saudi Aramco, which appeared to have been the work of Iran, and left Trump’s friends in Riyadh feeling dangerously exposed.
What, then, was the tipping point? The storming of the American embassy in Baghdad, only a few months after the Aramco attack, was clearly important: other than personal criticism – or the prospect of impeachment, from which the confrontation provides a useful distraction – nothing enrages Trump so much as spectacles of American weakness. A sense of pique may also have contributed to the assassination order. Soleimani seemed to take pleasure in taunting the Americans. ‘There is not one night we sleep without thinking of you,’ he said in July 2018 on Iranian television. ‘Mr Gambler Trump, we are near you where you don’t expect.’ Trump may have wished to prove to Soleimani that he was near him when he didn’t expect. And Khamenei’s remark, after the storming of the embassy in Baghdad, that ‘you can’t do anything,’ may have been the last straw.
It’s hard to explain Trump’s decision other than as a response to insult, since such a dangerous escalation seems inconsistent with his aversion to foreign wars, and his (so far) unerring sensitivity to his right-wing isolationist base. As Robert Malley of the International Crisis Group remarked on Twitter, killing Soleimani is for all intents and purposes a declaration of war against Iran. It is, of course, possible that Trump is unaware of this, or that he imagines that Iran ‘can’t do anything’ in response and will simply absorb the blow – in which case he is hallucinating.
By killing Soleimani, Trump has not only supplied the Islamic Republic with a powerful casus belli, he has also reinforced its longstanding narrative of martyrdom at the hands of the Great Satan, and may well help to strengthen the supreme leader’s hand at the very moment that the regime is facing popular anti-Iranian protests in Iraq and Lebanon, and reeling from a series of revolts at home in which hundreds of Iranians were killed by security forces. Not for the first time, the American government has proved an objective ally of Iran’s hardliners. The man once known as the living martyr would be smiling.
This post was modified on 5 January. The earlier version repeated a report that Naim Qassem, the deputy secretary-general of Lebanese Hizbullah, might have been killed along with Soleimani. He was not.
Comments
From the reports I’ve read, something similar happened at Mar-a-Lago, but Trump has got rid of the grown-ups who were there to keep him grounded. Apparently, there was great surprise at his choice but he was deaf to objections, convinced that his sanctions have weakened Iran to the point it won’t be able to retaliate; those who know, and it seems obviously true, say the attack will strengthen the regime’s moral grip on the country - who isn’t going to rally round in the face of an outside attack?
For a long time, the idea of such an irresponsible narcissistic ignoramus in the White House has seemed hugely dangerous and now we’re seeing why: the nuclear treaty with Iran abandoned for no reason other than it was Obama’s, and now this incredibly reckless assassination. We may be heading for a truly hideous conflagration in the Middle East for no more reason than one man’s vanity and wounded pride.
The 1979 Iranian revolution was the result of that.
When Blair consented to the war in Iraq he was ignorant of the 1953 coup (Jon Snow records a conversation he had with Blair in 2004 where he revealed he had never heard of Mossadeq). The result of that rush to arms was thousands of unnecessary deaths, the birth of ISIS and a strengthened Iran.
Why are we lead by fools?
At least the leaders you mention were either intelligent or listened to people who were, we are now led by a buffoon convinced he’s a genius. Fate help us all.
It seems to me that this resolves the apparent contradiction between their words, actions and the results. The problem, then, is to ensure that the people we put in positions of supreme power, are people who do not really want it. Plato clearly saw the dilemma two and a half millennia ago, but we seem no nearer solving it than the ancient Athenians.
Though they come to opposite conclusions and moral evaluations, Graucho and mototom want to go into the deep history of Iranian-Western relations that got us into the present mess, but, mototom, if you make (bad) unintended consequences a litmus test, you have to apply it to the Iranian side as well as to the American or British side. For instance, the 1979 revolution could have achieved its goals (however, the overthrowers of shah’s regime had diverse goals, and soon enough the theocrats had their former secular allies executed in great numbers) without seizing the US Embassy. They could have merely broken diplomatic relations and given the American community a week or two to get out of town. This would have vacated the obnoxious CIA presence too. Of course there would have been stay-behind agents (Iranians), but given the rigor of Iranian Revolutionary Guard measures, it’s doubtful they could have achieved much. Of course we’re led by fools, as are the Iranians.
Unfortunately, powerful and influential people (the movers and shakers) in both countries have “teleological” or religious-fatalistic views of history. For those on the American right the US has some kind of divinely approved mission to spread its power, while on the Iranian side the Shite version of history ever since the 8th century CE requires divinely sanctioned messianism—and martyrdom—by the sword (almost 100 years ago Elias Canetti wrote about this in “Crowds and Power”). Often these groups have been disenfranchised, right now they’re not. Trump is too cynical to share these beliefs, but he sure knows how to take advantage of them to justify his actions and strengthen his hold on the right.
Regardless of long-term “deeper causes” playing a role in all this, sensible people should be trying to avoid such flagrant provocations (Soleimani and Trump both being provocateurs, the former for ideological and political reasons, the latter for the sake of “look at me, what a marvelous creature I am.”) As with climate destruction, things will probably get much worse before they get better. A 2020 election loss by Trump might start to reverse the dire US Middle-Eastern policy in several respects, but whether Iran would be in a mood to reciprocate is unknowable at the present time. Given populist dissatisfactions around the globe, it doesn’t seem like “cooler heads will prevail”.
Someone said it "puts the US back into Middle East mire." Yes, where it's been since 2003.
And where Iran's been suiting itself for years.
Thus it’s been a major cause of the Syrian refugee nightmare through proxies supporting their Shia man there.
Plus its proxy in Lebanon contra Israel, and proxy in Yemen.
One of these last year brazenly attacked Saudi oil facilities.
And lately Iran has been openly cementing its direct influence in Shia Iraq, again including through proxy forces.
It briefly “allied” with US etc against ISIS for sake of its Syrian and Iraq fiefdoms.
But lately its Iraq proxies have turned on the US, and they definitely crossed a line in attacking the US embassy, signalling more to come.
Meanwhile a rational Iran should think carefully how it responds.
Its economy is being squeezed and it’s vastly outgunned.
LRB didn't get Brexit and didn't get Trump 2016. What more to say than sour discontent -- post-Modern liberal imperial stomping to the dustbin of history--finally.
I don't know anything about the Boeing 737 that fell out of the sky over Iran. Australia's media have been curiously silent on this - so far. We will have to wait to find out if this was a planned assault, a rogue attack, a coincidental terrorist attack on board the plane, or a mechanical/electronic failure. It seems too much of a coincidence to me for it to be anything other than a response to Soleimani's assassination.
Not once was the word "terrorist" mentioned. Instead, a fawning mini obituary of an elite killer.