Trump’s Charisma
Eli Zaretsky
Several factors point to a Democratic victory in the next US presidential election, including success in the 2018 midterms, a series of state polls, and enormous rank and file enthusiasm, reflected in the large number of candidates who qualified for the debates. Still, the Democrats vastly underestimated Trump in 2016 and may repeat the mistake in 2020. Wishful thinking is not the only pitfall. Understanding the nature of Trump’s divisive personality, and the relation between that divisiveness and America’s politics, is still undeveloped. Here Max Weber’s theory of charisma may be helpful.
Charisma, according to Weber, is a quality of the individual personality that sets them aside from ordinary men and women, so that they are ‘treated as endowed with … exceptional powers or qualities’. Charisma supplements other forms of political power such as bureaucracy (Trump’s ‘deep state’), plutocracy and aristocracy (strong in Weber’s time and perpetuated in the US in the legacy practices of elite universities). Writing in Germany during the First World War, Weber did not believe that traditional democratic values, such as equality and inclusion, could explain the politics of what he called ‘mass-states’ or ‘leader-democracies’, such as Germany, Britain, France and the United States. Rather, such states generate charismatic leaders capable of strong and independent direction, both to allow mass democracy to flourish, and to fulfil their geopolitical role. According to Weber, the charismatic leader has three qualities, all of which Trump exemplifies, and all of which the Democrats misunderstand.
First, the charismatic leader’s power rests on beating rivals in competition, rather than on knowledge or right of inheritance; the charismatic leader is always an expert in struggle. Their status as victor, however, is always in doubt. Charisma is bestowed by the masses, who remain the ultimate authority; the claim to a special mission breaks down when it is not recognised by those to whom the leader ‘feels he has been sent’. In Trump’s case, his charisma rests not so much on having previously beaten his rivals, as on beating them over and over, like a children’s superhero. Understanding this is key to understanding his constantly picking fights and engaging in apparently absurd conflicts, especially after he seems to have won a victory – as with the Mueller Report, or immediately after his election. Democrats see this as an expression of personal insecurity, bad temper and bullying. It may well be, but Trump’s ‘insecurity’, his unending struggle with those who question his legitimacy, is integral to his charisma.
Second, the charismatic leader in a democracy must articulate and defend a new direction and new values for the country as a whole, values that necessarily derive from creative individuals and not from institutions. The Democrats have difficulty seeing that Trump is doing this because of their defensiveness regarding the Obama presidency. Obama’s articulation of the need for what he called a ‘new mindset’, not just a new policy, was in good part responsible for his charisma in 2008 (much greater than Trump’s). Obama’s switch from charismatic leader to pragmatic manager once he took office left a void into which Trump stepped eight years later. It is impossible to understand Trump’s historic role without seeing that he is fulfilling, however perversely, the promise of a new beginning that Obama made in 2008.
Third, charismatic leaders to demonstrate that they are personally responsible for their decisions in a way that the bureaucrat, or the party leader in a parliamentary system, is not. The liberal complaint that Trump makes everything about himself – his egoism or narcissism – misses the point that charisma must be personal. One way that this element of personal responsibility shows itself is by uninhibited associative speech, which presupposes a suspension of ego control – what is often regarded as Trump ‘running his mouth’. Here, taken more or less at random, is an example of Trump’s speech:
We have people coming into the country, or trying to come in, we’re stopping a lot of them. And we’re taking people out of the country, you wouldn’t believe how bad these people are.
The Democrats reduce this to Trump’s obviously egregious racism. But it is also an example of how he lets his guard down to convince his followers that they are seeing a ‘real person’, not a scripted persona. Weber’s prototype for ancient charisma, the Hebrew prophets, frequently made public appearances in which they lacked control, behaved unpredictably and exposed themselves to abuse. Gladstone, Weber’s prototype for modern charisma, was noted for speaking extemporaneously, supposedly a sign of his personal responsibility or ‘genuineness’. Here again it is Trump’s charisma, not his personality, that needs to be understood.
Still, Weber’s focus on charisma has a notable gap: what exactly creates the bond between the leader and his or her followers? Here, Freudian mass psychology deepens Weber’s analysis. Freud showed in his book on mass psychology that in democratic societies the charismatic bond may rest on an appeal to frustrated or unfulfilled narcissism. The followers idealise the leader as they once – in childhood – idealised themselves. For this to work, the charismatic leader has to possess not only exceptional qualities but also the typical qualities of the individuals who follow him, in a ‘clearly marked and pure form’ that gives the impression ‘of greater force and of more freedom of libido’. The charismatic leader thus appears as an ‘enlargement’ of the follower, completing the follower’s self-image rather than, as in other forms of charisma, being out of reach.
Charismatic leaders may also appeal to their follower’s better natures – as, for example, Lincoln and Roosevelt did. Such appeals to what Freud called the ego-ideal also raise self-esteem, more firmly than the narcissistic bond that Trump favours. Trump not only refuses to do this, but appeals to the opposite values to Lincoln and Roosevelt: nationalism rather than patriotism, exclusion rather than inclusion, self-interest rather than social justice. This is why he stirs up fury and hatred, along with loyalty and admiration. Both the love and the hate arise out of an intense personal connection, which is what Weber meant by charisma.
Understanding Trump’s charisma offers important clues to understanding the problems that the Democrats need to address. Most important, the Democratic candidate must convey a sense that he or she will fulfil the promise of 2008: not piecemeal reform but a genuine, full-scale change in America’s way of thinking. It’s also crucial to recognise that, like Britain, America is at a turning point and must go in one direction or another. Finally, the candidate must speak to Americans’ sense of self-respect linked to social justice and inclusion. While Weber’s analysis of charisma arose from the German situation, it has special relevance to the United States of America, the first mass democracy, whose Constitution invented the institution of the presidency as a recognition of the indispensable role that unique individuals play in history.
Comments
The problem with being left of centre is that it is associated with suffering, not success.
Johnson is a success at pushing himself forward. Corbyn's charisma is etched in the acid bath of suffering.
In Freud’s work there is a distinction between the high and low ego ideal, with the latter being comparable to a type of narcissism, but I argue that it does have its own type of ego ideal. The high ego ideal relates to ego drives of competency, conscientiousness in work, and has a strong idealization of authority figures or parental-substitutes. The low ego ideal, is defined as not having a strong idealization, the parental-substitute is felt to be more on equal terms although they might have an edge, or something that gives them an advantage. The low ego ideal doesn't register as competency and conscientiousness but as being a doer who gets things done even if they are not traditional or accepted ways. This individual doesn't feel the ego ideal tensions to have to take on more knowledge and fear the embarrassment of not knowing as much as he should, he feels special/exceptional and "trusts his gut" and his ability to improvise. Although, as Trump shows, this doesn't mean that he is actually able to improvise well and do better than someone who practices with the teleprompter. But ,Trump feels that he is exceptional, and his self-satisfaction is communicated in his mannerisms and physiognomy, and this is enough for some of his followers to feel like he does well.
The idea of Trump being like a prophet and letting himself lose self-control doesn’t sit well with me. I would associate the prophets more with invoking symbols and speaking poetically in a moment of ecstasy.
Zaretsky writes that charismatic leader needs:
“new direction and new values for the country as a whole, values that necessarily derive from creative individuals and not from institutions”
The Make America Great Again slogan does not appear to be a new mindset. It is perhaps a new mindset in the sense that you people have to admit that things are not great anymore, but in the notion that we only have to tap into what is already a part of us. It is not a creative leap and as Zaretsky intimates, is built more on exclusion and exclusiveness.
It would be a creative leap to for the democratic candidate to tout social justice but, just as Zaretsky points out all of the character flaws that the left sees in Trump, the political right will point these out in such a candidate. He or she has white guilt, he is a beta male, he or she wants a big government and cannot count on his or her own self-reliance, etc.
The actual term high ego ideal is from W. Reich, but Freud talks of how "In many individuals the separation between the ego and the ego ideal is not very far advanced; the two still coincide readily; the ego has often preserved its earlier narcissistic self-complacency. The selection of the leader is very much facilitated by this circumstance." This is in the same passage that you quoted from in 'Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego.'
In Libidinal Types, Freud differentiates the obsessional from the narcissistic type by indicating that the former "is distinguished by the predominance of the super-ego, which is separated from the ego under great tension" while with the latter
"[t]here is no tension between ego and super-ego (indeed, on the strength of this type one would scarcely have arrived at the hypothesis of a super-ego)... People belonging to this type impress others as being ‘personalities’; they are especially suited to act as a support for others, to take on the role of leaders and to give a fresh stimulus to cultural development or to damage the established state of affairs."
I take up these passages, along with the thoughts of other analysts, and my own clinical examples to argue for the different expressions of the high and low ego ideal. This work is in Psychoanalysis and Hidden Narrative in Film: Reading the Symptom (Routledge, 2018).
"I do think MAGA is a reorientation to meaning."
Sure, but this is a much more mundane statement than a
“new direction and new values for the country as a whole, values that necessarily derive from creative individuals and not from institutions.”
Trump's followers are simply waiting for him to save their coal plant, build the wall, and stimulate the economy. With Hitler, there could be an argument that the appeal to the return to the glory of the German Reich went along with new directions and new values. Individuals were called upon to make sacrifices and create an ideal for the future of Germany, even if in a grotesque and inhuman way. Trump and Brexit are quite tepid in comparison.
Again, thanks for the stimulating piece, Trevor
Freud technically uses the expression:
"A man who has exchanged his narcissism for homage to a high ego ideal has not necessarily on that account succeeded in sublimating his libidinal instincts." On Narcissism
But, it's not used consistently across the discussion of the differences of tension or differentiation in the superego.
I'm going to find the piece you mention. Thanks for the suggestion.
I'm in private practice and don't teach. I've been in a couple of Psychology and Social Work depts. to teach the psychoanalytic/dynamic sections in their survey courses, but that is all.
Best, Trevor
A useful insight, one Trump himself seems to have had; hence his obsession with being the anti-Obama.
What to do? I agree that whoever the Democrats nominate, to defeat Trump will a candidate whose appeal is not merely to restore an (imaginary) past of good feelings. Although I share the fear that being "too left" could cost Democrats the election, I can't see the charismatic appeal of just going back to the good old days. Perhaps championing a national struggle to halt climate change, as part of a program to reverse the economic decline of the so-called middle class, would be sufficiently inspirational.
Exactly so - which is why Biden's recent promise to not change a thing if he is elected means that should the Democrats make the fatal error of selecting him, Trump will win again.
Nice piece. Thanks for writing.
Zaretsky says “several factors point to a Democratic victory in the next US presidential election”. Among them he mentions an “enormous rank and file enthusiasm, reflected in the large number of candidates who qualified for the debates”. But this large number of candidates reflects rank and file enthusiasm for just one candidate: Bernie Sanders.
Sanders emerged from the 2016 debates as the most popular politician in the USA, more popular than either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton. Republicans I spoke with during the debates said they didn’t like Trump, and would vote for Sanders if the Democrats nominated him. The Democrats would have won the presidency in a landslide if they had nominated Sanders. But the party’s neoliberal grandees hated Sanders because he’s a social democrat, so they rigged the primaries against him (Is this news to Zaretsky? Has he never heard of Wikileaks?) and now they’re doing it again. By flooding the competition with other candidates, they’re ensuring that Sanders won’t win the party’s nomination on the first ballot, and a second ballot will have to be held. The “superdelegates”, party hacks who shafted Sanders back in 2016, can’t vote on the first ballot, but they can on the second, and they’ll shaft him in 2020 just as they did back in 2016.
The Democrats didn’t lose in 2016 because they underestimated Trump and his charisma. They lost because they overestimated Clinton and her charisma. The more voters saw of her, the more Clinton’s poll numbers dropped because she offered nothing of substance. She campaigned as a woman, and it was time we had a woman president.
Weber’s theory of charisma isn’t wrong, but Zaretky is wrong to apply it to Trump. Americans didn’t vote for Trump as much as they voted against Clinton and the failed establishment politics she represents. Because everyone knows establishment politics has failed, and failed disastrously. That’s why Trump presented himself as an outsider, not a professional politician but a businessman, and Americans were so sick of professional politicians that they persuaded themselves this notorious con man might for once be telling the truth. Because they had no alternative.
Not even Bismarck reached charismatic political status. Instead Weber thought of him as a great statesman, though he despised the Bismarck legend which was an anti-democratic sentiment. He also criticised Bismarck for holding back the defining feature of modern mass democracy: equal suffrage.
Where Weber is still relevant is his analysis of plebiscitary leadership and its tendency towards authoritarianism (which he termed Caesarism). The leader is elected directly by the people and to achieve this the plebiscitary leader has to make - or manufacture - an emotional appeal to voters. In Weber's day (he died in 1920) Bismarck achieved this, as did Theodor Roosevelt, and so onwards with many US Presidents, including Donald Trump. The plebiscitary vote, where Trump did not obtain a majority, gives the US President a power and legitimacy advantage over Congress and the political parties.
So, when invoking Weber, it's best to subsume charisma to his more penetrating analysis of plebiscitary democracy. Weber provides this definition in Economy and Society (p. 268): "Plebiscitary democracy - the most important type of leader-democracy (Fuehrer-Demokratie) - is a variant of charismatic authority, which hides behind a legitimacy that is formally derived from the will of the governed. The leader (demagogue) rules by virtue of the devotion and trust which his political followers have in him personally."
The United States has far greater experience in handling the tension between President and Congress, something George Washington himself flagged up when offering himself to the voters for his second presidential term. Here in the United Kingdom we are completely unprepared for the threat of Caesarism to parliamentary democracy. With his classical eye Weber would already have spotted the upcoming Gracchi brothers.
Charisma does pass into the modern world but in an altered form. Perhaps we can agree on that. Charisma transitions into the modern electoral era in the form of the plebiscitary leadership. "The most important transitional type is the legitimation of authority by plebiscite: plebiscitary leadership. The most common examples are the modern party leaders." Weber sees this as typical of US democracy. The would-be President has to sell himself - or herself - to the mass of electors. This involves an emotional appeal. "This accounts for a tendency to favor the type of individual who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership." This well describes Donald Trump and, over here in the UK, Boris Johnson. Johnson and Jeremy Hunt are engaged in competition to out-promise each other in order to become party leader - and so prime minister under the UK's rotten constitution. The "mass" base, however, is a ludicrous 160,000 Conservative party members. Johnson will win this competition because he has the greater emotional appeal to this miniscule electorate.
My point is that we should not ascribe to Boris Johnson or any US President supernatural or superhuman powers of the charismatic leader. They are plebiscitary leaders deeply involved in the black arts of modern politics: demagogy, propaganda machines, manipulation of emotions, the projection - and now amplification- of personality through media. Your own study of the cultural psychology of emotional bonding between leader and follower is important - and part of a proud tradition at the New School, but I would argue this is best pursued within the framework of modern electoral politics.
The Democrats must and it is imperative, use psychology against this demagogue, and use his own weaknesses against him.
It doesn't take a Iago to ruin this man and his grip on the Presidency
Firstly, Trump was able to convincingly point to a partisan media that was seeking to destroy him. These attacks had a double-edged quality, as what was presented as a train-wreck of a campaign was also a ratings winner, drawing in both liberals desirous of laughing at Trump and providing huge amounts of free publicity for his campaign.
Secondly, Trump presented himself as an everyman. He uses a very simple vocabulary, he doesn't deploy skilful rhetoric as Obama did, he doesn't display any signs of intellectual snobbery. This allowed him to take the personal mockery he was subjected to and say to the swath of American people without college degrees and/or who live outside of liberal metropolises, this mockery directed at myself is how the Hillary Clintons of the world think about you. They think you're dumb, they think you're ignorant. In this respect, one of the most crucial moments of the race was Hillary Clinton confirming this view by branding Trump supporters as 'deplorables'.
If Democrats and the media aligned with them continue to attack Trump by mocking him, my view is he will win again easily. By licensing boorish behavior by both liberals (for whom white poor/rich middle-aged men are the only demographic they can insult and denigrate with good conscience) and his own supporters, Trump turned the campaign away from any kind of nuance and made it all about winning and losing itself, and given he has now already won once, he requires no leap of faith from his base this time around.
Lastly, in the UK we see the same dynamic around Remainers treatment of Brexit voters. While requiring to change minds re Brexit in order to win a second referendum, Remainers struggle to bracket their disdain for the ignorance, racism, xenophobia, etc. of those they would convert, and continue to support counter-productive mocking/derogatory memes that posit the Leave position as a fundamentally stupid view (sawing off a branch one is sat on, etc.) rather than acknowledging that Brexit is about wider political, cultural, economic differences.