Stoke and Copeland
Aaron Bastani
In yesterday’s by-election in Stoke-on-Trent Central, Labour’s Gareth Snell beat the Ukip leader, Paul Nuttall, into second place. Many people, in the Labour Party and the media, had talked up Ukip’s chances in advance, with one commentator even speculating it could be ‘Corbyn’s Waterloo’. Last summer, 70 per cent of the city voted to leave the EU, with Nuttall describing the seat as Britain’s ‘Brexit capital’. Between that and Labour’s ever diminishing majorities, Ukip were understandably bullish.
But they came second, with only 79 more votes than the Tories. As the dust settles, it’s easy to see why: beyond Nigel Farage, the party contains not one competent politician; Nuttall couldn’t have run a worse campaign; Labour’s ground game was very impressive; and Jeremy Corbyn’s commitment to triggering Article 50 meant Labour wasn’t as vulnerable as it could have been over Brexit. Had Owen Smith led the party and insisted on ‘rejecting’ Article 50, things might have turned out very differently.
Labour’s success in Stoke is being talked down by Corbyn’s detractors, but it shouldn’t be. Last night offered Ukip an opportunity to establish a foothold in the Midlands, confirming their belief that the leave vote could translate to electoral success. Had that happened, the talk would have been Labour seats in the North and Midlands in 2020 going the way of Scotland eighteen months ago. Now, such speculation is as absurd as Nuttall’s storybook CV.
In the medium-term, however, Ukip’s demise offers a major advantage to the Conservatives. In the last General Election half the electorate voted for either party, with Ukip winning almost four million votes. The huge polling lead currently enjoyed by the government reflects – as well as Labour’s difficulties – how most of those who voted Ukip last time round will probably turn blue after Brexit. The parlour talk of the London media was that Labour had more to fear from Ukip than the Tories, but this was never true. After Brexit, eurosceptics and voters with ‘traditional values’ are returning to the Conservative Party.
That also explains the Tory success in yesterday’s other by-election, in Copeland. Local factors can’t be ignored – foremost among them the importance of Sellafield and nuclear power in the area, and the Labour leadership’s perceived indifference to it – but a governing party hasn’t taken an opposition seat in a by-election since 1982.
The Labour candidate, Gillian Troughton, picked up 37 per cent of the vote, enough to have won the seat at the last general election (and the same share that Snell won in Stoke). But Ukip’s vote plummeted, with the Tories picking up their supporters. Meanwhile, a sliver of voters probably switched from Labour to the Liberal Democrats. If those two phenomena were to become a national pattern – Ukip voters going Tory and a small minority of Labour voters defecting to Tim Farron’s party – Corbyn would face major problems.
Between them Labour and the Liberal Democrats (or its Liberal/SDP predecessors) enjoyed a comfortable majority of the popular vote in every general election between 1964 and 2010. In 2015, however, Ukip and the Tories won half the vote between them. This reflects a major shift to the right on a range of issues: dissatisfaction with the EU and ‘elites’; belief that Labour was responsible for the 2008 crisis and, therefore, austerity; growing hostility to migration; anger at declining living standards and services; and a blind faith – despite all the evidence – that the Tories are uniquely equipped to handle the economy.
The Tory victory in Copeland last night unfolded in a new context. Britain now has a six-party system (seven if you include the Greens), and elections are not zero-sum transactions between government and opposition. Furthermore, Brexit has clearly left a dynamic situation in its aftermath – which led to the Copeland result last night, but also to Richmond-on-Thames and Witney last year.
Corbyn’s stated mission in leading Labour is to offer a break with the past and create an economy for the many, not the few. At a time where the values of the right have never enjoyed greater consent, and with Labour facing a crisis that has been decades in the making, the task before him and his supporters is gargantuan. All the more reason to get on with it.
Comments
The results also offer little support for the media assumption that Europe is now the great divide of British politics. If there really is a great groundswell of popular opposition to brexit, you have to wonder why the LDs continue to struggle so badly. At no point since the referendum have they been above 14 percent in national polling.
That was MY stated mission, too. I failed to get voters on my side because, like Corbyn, I could not compromise with them.
"Had Owen Smith led the party and insisted on ‘rejecting’ Article 50, things might have turned out very differently."
Brexit wasn't the only issue in these elections, though, was it? Voters time and again told reporters that they found Corbyn an extremist weirdo with his pacifism, lax attitude to immigration and his cordial contacts with terror outfits. Smith, by casting a more mainstream image, could have won both elections handsomely.
Arguing with Corbyn fanciers is as pointless as arguing with Holocaust deniers. There is no evidence so obvious that they will accept it.
The people up in the north will never go for Labour under an old pacifist chattering about Palestine.
Corbyn is weak on immigration and weak on defence. Say no more.
Harold Wilson would have had a thumping majority.
Labour scraped through miserably in a stronghold. Letting ukip run a close second in one of your strongholds?
Copeland?
Labour needs to win 100 Tory marginals to overturn the Tory majority in 2020. What hope?
You'll be wiped out in 2020. Then what will you say?
These numbers, aside from being crude estimates, are based on by-election results, which tend to be less favourable for the incumbent party. It's not unreasonable, on the basis of Labour's performance in Copeland, to imagine it holding fewer than 170 seats after the next election. Although Aaron is correct that a total wipeout of Labour in the north and Midlands is unlikely, it seems probable that the scale of its losses in those regions is going to be very large. Given where we are now, and the capabilities of the current leadership team, the chances of Labour holding all the seats it currently has, let alone increasing its total, seems vanishingly small.
However, Islington and Hackney are Remain central, and demographically, the population is increasingly socially and economically liberal. Given Corbyn's hard Brexit stance and the increasing despair of these normally Labour-supporting voters at his refusal to step down for someone, you know, electable outside of the party membership, you can see the Lib Dems taking his seat off him (if only temporarily from Labour).
As someone who has gone through something of a long, dark, teatime of the soul over Labour and Brexit, I was surprised.
Corbyn himself is aware of the dichotomy between his actions and the views of his personal electors, but is unrepentant. He is prepared, however, to admit that his support for the government was based as much on expediency as principle, saying, "We would lost a lot of the north if we had opposed the referendum result."
What else could they have done? Declare the result invalid and campaign impotently to have it overturned? That's what the Lib Dems have been doing since June 24 and they haven't been above 14% in national polling since.
The reality is there's no evidence of any widespread disillusion among Leave voters; in fact, all the polling shows that, despite everything, most Remain voters have now adjusted to the outcome and moved on.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/18/bregrets-remainers-polls-leavers-brexit-referendum
If Labour had taken the Lib Dem approach they'd have haemmorhaged even more working-class support and would now have about as much significance as the Lib Dems.
That raises a dilemma for leftists. Defending the interests of the majority of the population in Britain today means defending the interests of (in global terms) the privileged. Of course some will deny this. Some may even still talk hopefully of 'the 99%' allied against the super-rich. But the last few years have made it clear that other divisions are possible; and to most people, they make more sense. Socialists want a fair and just world: but right now, the main gripe of most people in the West is that the world is no longer quite as unfair as it used to be. The left can't offer them what they want without ceasing to be itself.
In the future, being a leftist is going to be about defending the interests of the minority who genuinely are oppressed against the majority who merely think they are. But then, to those who have become used to enjoying special privileges, merely being reduced to the same status as everyone else can feel like oppression.
The Corbyn experiment was worth trying, because the alternative is continued slow decline, with the Labour party being pushed further and further right every time it loses an election (and probably even if it wins). But barring some event which completely changes the terms of political discourse (another banking crisis, for instance) it is not going to bring victory.
The elephant curve shows us that neoliberalism has, in economic terms, been fairly benign for the world's poorest 10%, been hugely beneficial for percentiles 10-70 (as well as the 1% and especially the 0.1%) while being *bad* only for those in the trunk at 75-90%.
The arguments of the hard left set against this background seem to suggest that completely upending the current system and in so doing throwing 60% of the world's population under a bus for the sake of benefitting a richer 15% is "progressive".
I say this not to troll, but because I genuinely haven't heard a decent answer to this point, and would like to hear what the LRB board thinks. Even Piketty, when I saw him at a Q&A in London, didn't have an answer. It's why he's proposing wealth transfers from the 1% to the 75-90%- he seems to accept that the current system has (by and large) worked well for the people of the world.
"The modern conservative is engaged in one of man's oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness".
At least three-quarters of the billion or so who've escaped extreme poverty in recent decades live in China, a state-directed economy protected by high tariffs barriers. Certainly no exemplar of free-market orthodoxy. And perhaps the main cause of extreme poverty reduction elsewhere in the developing world has been the influx of cheap products from this very heterodox, unwestern economy.
Here in the West, a generation of neoliberal hegemony has produced levels of inequality unseen since victorian times, lately culminating in explosive political results. But for the true believer the blame continues to be laid at the door of a malign "hard" left, a group that hasn't seen power since the economic golden age of the social-democratic post-war decades.
There's the suggestion that the current system has been designed- I'm not sure that's accurate. Regarding the quote- I'm not seeking to justify the status quo on the basis it having decent objectives. I'm suggesting instead that the effects are, economically at least, broadly positive worldwide.
You suggest that China is not a free market economy and so doesn't count as part of the neoliberal world order, but then make the point that its exports have changed the world. Either the world order is neoliberal (in which case China counts as a huge part of that order) or it isn't (in which case the term loses much of its meaning).
Your point about how we have seen "levels of inequality unseen since Victorian times" is plainly false. I *do* have something to back this up, which is here: http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/pikettys-inequality-story-in-six-charts
We're on firmer ground going a third of a century later and picking the start of WWII/the Wall Street Crash as the "bad old days". And, yes, this point in time does mark the start of a "U shape" which bottoms out in the mid 70s and then starts climbing but (i) that's only for income, not wealth; and (ii) the extent to which we've returned to 1929 depends hugely on which country we're talking about. US, yes. Canada, no.
But that is, of course, looking at things from a global perspective, which is no consolation to those in the West who feel they've lost out as a result of globalisation (and/or neoliberalism). Similarly, within countries, it's no consolation to people whose standard of living has declined to know that the economy of the country as a whole is growing.
Bastani observes, "Local factors can’t be ignored – foremost among them the importance of Sellafield and nuclear power in the area, and the Labour leadership’s perceived indifference to it – but a governing party hasn’t taken an opposition seat in a by-election since 1982." he is right.
I would argue these additional "local factors though, that perhaps Bastani agrees with but due to space did not itemize:
1. Foremost is that the Tories, and national press, were able to successfully define the election as the key issue being Corbyn's leadership which was anathma in this constituency given Salafield and the rural vote which is distrustful of the urban leadership now in place. Canvassers on the main allowed themselves to be engaged on that instead of focusing on a theme of "well, COrbyn isn't on the ballot, is he?" and hit the main talking points. May seem naive or simple, but in a by-election "local" is even more the overarching factor in which the larger themes of a general election are not as overwhelming.
2 - Traughton herself was weak in terms of voter engagement and stump speaking. This seems generally agreed by local party members but not reported well in the post-mortem. The cult of personality is never to be acceded to, but charisma and ability to relate one-on-one in what are essentially small voting districts cannot be ignored.
3 - Perhaps from frustration, the local party apparati was not well-organized or trained . . . again, allowing themselves to engage on the ground of the Tory's choosing: Corbyn. The traditional strength of Lib Dem, particularly in Whitehaven proper, also contributes to this lack of a strong local effort.
Of course, Labour goes in to the vote having to deal with the Selafield albatross (as Bastani correctly lifts up as his main "local" factor by singling it out) and the perception of a national Leadership at best skeptical of nuclear power. Though I agree, and have argued to folks in Labour given the US' experience in the 2012 general and 2010 and 2014 mid-terms, the working class is susceptible to what Bannon now terms "Economic Nationalism". Ergo the rapid growth of the US Tea PArty movement and the equally swift rise of UKIP from a laughable fringe.
Labour like its more right counterpart here, the Democratic Party, must seek a new vigilance in local work including identifying and training strong candidates, party building and an effective, nnon-elite way of communicating with the working class that is persuasive that these parties do in fact offer the best hope to their circumstance. In Copeland, Labour failed in every categorie: message, defining turf and candidate selection.