Between Ideology and Reality
The Editors
Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that 'the union and its forerunners have for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.' Writing in the LRB five years ago, Perry Anderson observed:
The integration of the East into the Union is the major achievement to which admirers of the new Europe can legitimately point. Of course, as with the standard encomia of the record of EU as a whole, there is a gap between ideology and reality in the claims made for it. The Community that became a Union was never responsible for the ‘fifty years of peace’ conventionally ascribed to it, a piety attributing to Brussels what in any strict sense belonged to Washington. When actual wars threatened in Yugoslavia, far from preventing their outbreak, the Union if anything helped to trigger them.
Comments
So much for ideology.
That said, I was instead surprised by the LRB’s reiteration of the old canard of the “End-of-Yugoslavia-caused by-premature-recognition”. The fact is that the European Community/EU did play a negative role, but much earlier. This happened when, on 13 July 1991, at a closed session, the Netherlands represented proposed the freezing of inter-Yugoslav borders and the convening of an international conference to establish agreed borders between the republics (which were fully entitled to secede). This proposal made sense, since the borders had been defined (or confirmed) by the rulers of a one-party revolutionary state, for whom the borders had a purely administrative significance.
The Dutch proposal was probably too little too late. Nevertheless, the crucial point (in terms of historical causality) was that it received zero support: not just from the eternally evil Germans or the Vatican, but from all other EC governments. Regardless of intentions and motivations, the reluctance to press for the redrawing of the inter-Yugoslav borders amounted to a complete abdication, and an encouragement to a military free-for-all. The immediate beneficiaries of this decision were those holding the greatest amount of military hardware (no prizes for guessing who). In the short, medium and long term, the losers were all minority groups scattered over the Yugoslav Federation: first of all, Serbs in Croatia, and Albanians Kosovars in Kosovo (who quickly realized the implications).
Of course, there were excellent reasons for not intervening (money and manpower costs). Douglas Hurd provided an eloquent defence. But after 13 July 1991 the EC/EU had already (unwittingly) given the go-ahead for the military free-for-all. Sending a troika to Belgrade (offering Yugoslavs loadsamoney in exchange for staying together) was simply meaningless.
All these facts have long been publicly known (see D. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, London 1995, p. 34). Why are they still neglected? Well, they present a slightly more complicated picture than that offered by the staple “nasty Germans and the Vatican” (or plain “Brussels bureaucrats”). It also provide little comfort for the anti-interventionist school.
Yes, Brussels got it wrong in 1991. But in July, not December. Contrary to what some believe, non-intervention is not always a panacea.
Guido Franzinetti